🤚 Mishnah Shevuot 3

שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל וְאָכַל כָּל שֶׁהוּא, חַיָּב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בְּאוֹכֵל כָּל שֶׁהוּא שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב, שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּב. אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְכִי הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בִּמְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן, שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה, חַיָּב שְׁתָּיִם:

With regard to oaths attesting to the truth about an utterance, which, when violated, render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two types that are actually four types. The initial two oaths, which relate to utterances about the future and are explicitly prohibited in the Torah, are: On my oath I will eat, or: On my oath I will not eat. These are expanded to four, to include oaths concerning utterances about the past: On my oath I ate, or: On my oath I did not eat. If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate any amount, even less than an olive-bulk, he is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? Rabbi Akiva said to them: And where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it? If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering, because an oath to refrain from eating includes refraining from drinking. If he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring two offerings.

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעֹרִין וּפַת כֻּסְּמִין, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעֹרִין וּפַת כֻּסְּמִין, וְאָכַל, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת:

If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate wheat bread and barley bread and spelt bread, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread or barley bread or spelt bread, and then he ate all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין הַרְבֵּה, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן וָשֶׁמֶן וּדְבַשׁ וְשָׁתָה, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת:

If he said: On my oath I will not drink, and then he drank several kinds of liquids, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not drink wine or oil or honey, and then he drank all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל אֳכָלִים שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לַאֲכִילָה וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לִשְׁתִיָּה, פָּטוּר. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר, קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם, וְהוּא אָכַל נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים, הֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה:

If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

אֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן מַמָּשׁ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מַמָּשׁ. כֵּיצַד. אָמַר, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֶתֵּן לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶתֵּן, שֶׁנָּתַתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא נָתַתִּי, שֶׁאִישַׁן וְשֶׁלֹּא אִישַׁן, שֶׁיָּשַׁנְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא יָשַׁנְתִּי, שֶׁאֶזְרֹק צְרוֹר לַיָּם וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶזְרֹק, שֶׁזָּרַקְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא זָרַקְתִּי. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה) לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִם כֵּן אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה, דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן. אָמַר לוֹ, מֵרִבּוּי הַכָּתוּב. אָמַר לוֹ, אִם רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ:

If one unwittingly takes a false oath about the past or breaks an oath he made about the future, both if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern oneself and if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern others, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for an oath on an utterance. And likewise, an oath on an utterance may address both tangible matters and intangible matters. How so? Examples of oaths about future actions that concern others are if one said: On my oath I will give so-and-so a particular item, or: On my oath I will not give it to him. Examples of such oaths about the past are if one said: On my oath I gave another a particular item, or: On my oath I did not give it to him. Examples of oaths about the future that address intangible matters are where one said: On my oath I will sleep, or: On my oath I will not sleep. Examples of such oaths about the past are where one said: On my oath I slept, or: On my oath I did not sleep. Other examples of oaths about intangible matters are when one takes an oath, saying: I will throw a stone into the sea, or: I will not throw it, or: I threw it, or: I did not throw it. Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future, as it is stated: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4). The Torah refers explicitly only to oaths about what one will do in the future. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, and one is liable only for oaths explicitly mentioned in the verse, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to him: The halakha in these cases is derived by amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִטֵּל, פָּטוּר. לְקַיֵּם וְלֹא קִיֵּם, פָּטוּר. שֶׁהָיָה בַדִּין, שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב, כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא, מָה אִם הָרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי, הֲרֵי הוּא חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ, מִצְוָה שֶׁהוּא מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בִשְׁבוּעַת הָרְשׁוּת, שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָהּ לָאו כְּהֵן, תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת מִצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בָהּ לָאו כְּהֵן, שֶׁאִם נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל וְלֹא בִטֵּל, פָּטוּר:

If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If he takes an oath to perform a mitzva and he does not perform it, he is also exempt, though it would have been fitting to claim that he is liable to bring the offering, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. The mishna explains: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for breaking it?The Rabbis said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for breaking an oath concerning an optional action, where the Torah rendered one liable for a negative oath not to perform it like for a positive oath to perform it, shall you also say one is liable with regard to breaking an oath concerning a mitzva, where the Torah did not render one liable for a negative oath like for a positive oath, since if one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and did not refrain, he is exempt.

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכֲלֶנָּה, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכֲלֶנָּה, וַאֲכָלָהּ, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד. שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, חַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר:

If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and he then says again: On my oath I will not eat it, and again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he then ate it, he is liable only once. Once the first oath had taken effect, the subsequent oaths could not, as a prohibition cannot take effect where another prohibition is already in place. This is an oath on an utterance, for which one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally breaking it, and for unwittingly breaking it one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. For an oath taken in vain, one is liable to receive lashes when it is taken intentionally, and one is exempt when it is taken unwittingly.

אֵיזוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, נִשְׁבַּע לְשַׁנּוֹת אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לָאָדָם, אָמַר עַל הָעַמּוּד שֶׁל אֶבֶן שֶׁהוּא שֶׁל זָהָב, וְעַל הָאִישׁ שֶׁהוּא אִשָּׁה, וְעַל הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא אִישׁ. נִשְׁבַּע עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר, אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי גָמָל שֶׁפּוֹרֵחַ בָּאֲוִיר, וְאִם לֹא רָאִיתִי נָחָשׁ כְּקוֹרַת בֵּית הַבַּד. אָמַר לְעֵדִים בֹּאוּ וַהֲעִידוּנִי, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא נְעִידֶךָ. נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה, שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲשׂוֹת סֻכָּה, וְשֶׁלֹּא לִטֹּל לוּלָב, וְשֶׁלֹּא לְהָנִיחַ תְּפִלִּין, זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר:

Which oath is an oath taken in vain, mentioned in the previous mishna (27b)? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, for example, one says about a stone column that it is made of gold, or about a man that he is a woman, or about a woman that she is a man. Another type of oath taken in vain is when one takes an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., if he says: If I did not see a camel flying through the air, or: If I did not see a snake as large as the beam of the olive press. In the case of one who said to witnesses: Come and testify for me, and they replied: On our oath we will not testify for you, that is an oath taken in vain, because it involves taking an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva. Other examples of this include an oath not to build a sukka, or not to take a lulav, or not to don phylacteries. This type of oath is an oath taken in vain, for which one is liable to receive lashes if he takes the oath intentionally, and for which he is exempt if he takes it unwittingly.

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכֲלֶנָּה, הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. אֲכָלָהּ, עָבַר עַל שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. לֹא אֲכָלָהּ, עָבַר עַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי:

If one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf, and later said: On my oath I will not eat it, the first oath is an oath on an utterance, and the second is an oath taken in vain, as he took an oath to perform an action that would violate his previous oath. If he ate it, he violated the prohibition against taking an oath in vain. If he did not eat it, he violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance.

שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִים וּבִפְסוּלִין, בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין, מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד:

As opposed to the halakhot of an oath of testimony, which will be discussed in the following chapter, the halakhot of an oath on an utterance apply to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to testify and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, i.e., when one takes an oath on his own, at his own initiative. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִים וּבִפְסוּלִים, בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין, וּמִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר. אַחַת זוֹ, וְאַחַת זוֹ, הַמֻּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, חַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. אָמַר, לֹא אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם וְלֹא הֵנָחְתִּי תְפִלִּין הַיּוֹם, מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אָנִי, וְאָמַר אָמֵן, חַיָּב:

Liability for an oath taken in vain applies to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to bear witness and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and also when one takes an oath on his own. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is exempt. With regard to both this, an oath on an utterance, and that, an oath taken in vain, even if he is administered the oath by others, he is liable. For example, if one said: If I did not eat today, or: I did not don phylacteries today, and another said to him: I administer an oath to you that your statement is true, and the former said: Amen, he is liable if the statement was false.